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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 18AUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
V.

CASA DE MARYLAND, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MOTION TO EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF THE
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND
TO EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF THIS MOTION

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the other federal parties, hereby
moves, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 21, for expedited
consideration of the petition for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit filed in
this case. The petition for a writ of certiorari is being filed
simultaneously with this motion. Because of the importance of the
questions presented for review and the urgent need for their prompt
resolution, the government moves for expedited consideration of
the petition so that the petition may be resolved before the
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Court's summer recess. The government also moves for expedited
consideration of this motion and for this Court to order
respondents to respond to this motion by Wednesday, May 29, 2019.
Respondents have agreed to respond to this motion by close of
business on - that date.
1.

a.

This case is one of several pending before this

Court concerning the policy of immigration enforcement discretion
known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). See App.
at 97a-101a, fl-IS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 18-587 (Nov.
5, 2018) (Regents App.) (June 15, 2012 memorandum). As discussed
in the government's petition for a writ of certiorari, deferred
action is a practice in which the Secretary of Homeland Security
exercises enforcement discretion to notify an alien of the decision
to forbear from seeking the alien's removal for a designated
period. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525
U.S. 471, 483-484 (1999). DACA made deferred action available for
a period of two years, subject to renewal, to "certain young people
who were brought to this country as children." Regents App. 97a;
see Id. at 99a-100a. The DACA policy made clear, however, that it
"confer[red] no substantive right, immigration status or pathway
to citizenship," because "[o]nly the Congress, acting through its
legislative authority, can confer these rights."

Id. at 101a.

Since its inception in 2012, approximately 793,000 individuals
have received deferred action under the DACA policy. Id. at 12a-
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13a. As of September 2017, there remained approximately 689,000
active DACA recipients. Id. at 13a.
In 2016, this Court affirmed, by an equally divided Court, a
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit holding that two related DHS deferred-action policies
including an expansion of the DACA policy

--

--

likely violated the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and were contrary to the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and therefore should be
enjoined.
curiam).

See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (per
In September 2017, the former Acting Secretary of

Homeland Security determined that the original DACA policy would
likely be struck down by the courts on the same grounds and that
the policy was unlawful. Accordingly, she instituted an orderly
wind-down of the DACA policy. Regents App. 111a-119a.
Respondents brought this suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland challenging the rescission of
DACA. They allege that the termination of DACA is unlawful because
it is arbitrary and capricious under the APA; violates the APA's
requirement for notice-and-comment rulemaking; denies respondents
equal protection and due process; and permits the government to
use information obtained through DACA in a manner inconsistent
with principles of due process and equitable estoppel. See Pet.
App. 12a. Similar challenges have been brought in district courts
in California, New York, and the District of Columbia.
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b.

The district court granted the government's motion for

summary judgment in relevant part. Pet. App. 62a-98a. Although
the court concluded that respondents' claims were justiciable, id.
at 75a-79a, it rejected on the merits each of respondents'
challenges to DACA's rescission, Id. at 81a-97a.

The court

reasoned that the rescission was exempt from APA's notice-andcomment requirements because it represents the agency's guidance
on the "exercise of discretion," not "a rule with the force of
Id. at 82a.

law."

It rejected respondents' arbitrary-and-

capricious challenge, observing that "[r]egardless of whether DACA
is, in fact, lawful or unlawful," the agency's "belief that it was
unlawful and subject to serious legal challenge is completely
rational."

Id. at 83a.

And it concluded that respondents'

allegation of discriminatory intent was "unsupported by the
record," and that they otherwise failed to establish a violation
of equal-protection, due-process, or estoppel principles. Id. at
93a; see id. at 84a95a.*

The district court also concluded that it was
"theoretically possible" that the government might use information
obtained from IJACA requestors in a manner inconsistent with
estoppel principles, and therefore enjoined DHS to comply with the
information-sharing policy as "first announced in 2012" pending
further order from the court. Pet. App. 95a; 3/15/18 Am. Order 1;
see Pet. App. 95a-97a. The court of appeals, however, vacated
that injunction, and it is not at issue in the government's
petition. Pet. App. 33a-35a.
*

*
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On May 17, 2019, a divided panel of the court of appeals

C.

affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, dismissed in
part, and remanded. Pet. App. la-37a. The court first determined
that respondents' claims were justiciable. Id. at 14a-25a. It
acknowledged that, under Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 82.1 (1985),
an agency's decision whether "to enforce the substantive law" was
presumptively "committed to agency discretion by law," 5 U.S.C.
701(a) (2)

.

Pet. App. 19a; see id. at 18a-19a.

But the court

concluded that the presumption was inapplicable here, because
IJACA's rescission was a ",[m]ajor agency policy decision[]

,"

rather

than an exercise of enforcement discretion "in an individual case."
Id. at 20a. The court also concluded that the INA did not require
that challenges to DACA's rescission await a final order of removal
on the grounds that (1) the rescission of DACA was not a "'decision
or action' to 'commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders'" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) and
(2) another judicial review provision in Section 1252, which
requires "all questions of law and fact
action taken

* * *

* * *

arising from any

to remove an alien" be resolved through

"judicial review of a final [removal] order," 8 U.S.C. 1252(b) (9),
"'applies only with respect to review of an order of removal.'"
Pet. App. 14a, 16a (citations omitted)
On the merits; the court of appeals held that the APA's
notice-and-comment requirements did not apply to DACA's rescission
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because the rescission memorandum made a "general statement [I of
policy," Pet. App. 26a (quoting 5 U.S.C. 553(b) (A)), rather than
creating a "new binding rule of substantive law,". id. at 28a
(citation omitted).

But it held that the rescission was

substantively arbitrary and capricious on the ground that DHS
"failed to give a reasoned explanation for the change in policy."
Id. at 31a.

The court rejected DHS's reliance on the Texas

litigation as justifying the change because DACA and the Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(DAPA) policy, one of the two policies enjoined in the Texas
litigation, "are not identical." Id. at 32a (citation omitted)
And it criticized DHS for not "adequately account[ing] for the
reliance interests" of individuals who would be affected by the
rescission of the DACA policy. Id. at 33a.
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the district
court's arbitrary-and-capricious ruling, vacated DACA's rescission
in its entirety, and remanded the matter for "further proceedings,
consistent with this opinion." Pet. App. 36a. In light of that
disposition, the court of appeals "decline [d] to decide whether
DACA's rescission violates the Fifth Amendment's due process and
equal protection guarantees."

Id. at 35a.

Rather, the court

"vacate[d] the district court's judgment on th[o]se issues and
dismiss[ed] those claims." Id. at 37a.

I
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-

Judge Richardson concurred in part and dissented in part,
concluding that "the rescission of ]JACA is judicially unreviewable
under the APA." Pet. App. 42a; see Id. at 38a-61a. He rejected
the majority's new "general enforcement policies" exception to the
justiciability principles recognized in Chaney and other cases.'
Id. at 49a.

Judge Richardson noted that such an exception

was irreconcilable with Chaney itself, which concerned "the FDA's
categorical decision not to take enforcement action against a class
of actors (drug manufacturers, prison administrators, and others
in the drug distribution chain)" for the use of certain lethalinjection drugs.

Id. at 50a.

He also reasoned that such an

exception was "untenable" as a logical matter, observing that
"[sitandardizing (i.e., generalizing) how agents use their
prosecutorial discretion does not alter its character."

Id.

at 51a.
Judge Richardson determined that respondents' constitutional
claims were reviewable, Pet. App. 56a n.6, but he had "little
trouble" agreeing with the district court that they failed on the
merits, Id. at 56a. He reasoned that respondents' due-process
claim was meritless because they "fail[ed] to articulate a
constitutionally protected life, liberty, or property interest
impacted by the rescission."

Ibid.

And he concluded that

respondents' equal-protection claim faltered because they failed
to create a "plausible inference" of invidious animus on the part
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of the Attorney General or Acting Secretary in "tak[ing] the
official government actions at issue," much less the showing of
"outrageous discrimination" that would be required to establish
what in essence is a selective-prosecution claim. Id. at 58a-59a.
2.

For the 'reasons explained in the government's petition

for a writ of certiorari, expedited consideration of the
government's petition is warranted.

Twenty months ago, DHS

determined, in accordance with the views of the Attorney General,
that IJACA, a discretionary policy of immigration non-enforcement,
was unlawful, ill-advised, and should be discontinued. That policy
is materially indistinguishable from the DAPA and expanded IJACA
policies that the Fifth Circuit held were contrary to federal
immigration law in a decision that four Justices of this Court
voted to affirm. Yet, as a result of two nationwide preliminary
injunctions, the government

'

has been required to sanction

indefinitely an ongoing violation of federal law being committed
by nearly 700,000 aliens pursuant to the DACA policy. And the
very existence of this pending litigation '(and lingering
uncertainty) continues to impede efforts to enact legislation
addressing these issues.
There is little question that these conditions, combined with
the sheer importance of the questions presented, would ordinarily
warrant this Court's prompt review. And, indeed, in February 2018,
this Court recognized the' need for an "expeditious []
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resolution

of this dispute. DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 138 S. Ct.
1182. Since November 2018, however, the government's petitions
for writs of certiorari to the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits to
review this dispute have been pending before this Court. See D}{S
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 18-587 (filed Nov. 5, 2018);
Trump v. NAACP, No. 18-588 (filed Nov. 5, 2018); McAleenan v.
Batalla Vidal, No. 18-589 (filed Nov. .5, 2018)

.

Briefing was

completed on those petitions in early January 2019. And although
the petitions were all filed as petitions for writs of certiorari
before judgment, all parties agree that given the Ninth Circuit's
intervening decision, the Regents petition is properly treated as
an ordinary petition for a writ of certiorari after judgment.
With yet another court of appeals to have now fully considered
these issues, the government respectfully submits that further
percolation is unnecessary and the time for the Court to act is
now. Resolution of the pending petitions in Regents, NAACP, and
Batalla Vidal before the summer, recess is critical, if the
petitions are granted, to afford the government and the multiple
private and state parties involved sufficient time to coordinate
on a briefing schedule and to allow appropriate time for each side
to address, and for the Court to consider and resolve, the many
important issues presented by these cases. To be sure, the Court
could allow briefing on this petition to proceed on the ordinary
schedule, with a view to holding this petition while the Court
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resolves any of the other pending cases in which it grants plenary
review. But expedited consideration of this petition would permit
the Court to consider it alongside the others at the Court's final
June Conference and to determine whether, as the government's
petition contends, it should be granted and consolidated with the
cases in Regents and NAACP.
For the foregoing reasons, the government moves that the
Court adopt a briefing schedule that would require respondents to
file a response to the government's petition for a writ of
certiorari by June 4, 2019
took to file the petition

--

--

4 days longer than the government

in order to allow the Court to consider

the government's petition at its scheduled June 20, 2019 Conference
for resolution of the petition before the summer recess. Through
this motion, the government waives the 14-day period provided for
in this Court's Rule 15.5 between the filing of a brief in
opposition and the distribution of the petition and other materials
to the Court.
Finally, the government also respectfully requests
expedited consideration of this motion.

To allow for such

expedited consideration, respondents have agreed to respond to
this motion by close of business on Wednesday, May 29, 2019.
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Respectfully submitted.

NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General

